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LABOR LAW-Until Congress Acts, Secondary Picketing 
by Unions Subject to the Railway Labor Act 
Is Protected Against State Proscription-
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. 
Jacksonville Terminal Company* 
In a major labor dispute between the Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen and the Florida East Coast Railway Company (FEC), the 
parties, having exhausted all the procedures of the Railway Labor 
Act (RLA)1 for resolving a major dispute,2 resorted to self-help 
remedies.3 FEC unilaterally changed its operating employees' rates 
• 394 U.S. 369, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969). 
1. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1964). 
2. The RLA provides a panoply of procedures which disputants must follow before 
they may resort to self-help. Railway Labor Act §§ 1, 4-10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154-60 
(1964) [hereinafter RLA]. The procedures are purposely complex in order to facilitate 
the voluntary settlement of major disputes. The final step in those procedures is the 
creation of a presidential emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. 
RLA § IO, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). But the parties are not bound by the decision of 
the board, and nowhere in the RLA is compulsory arbitration required. See text ac-
companying notes 34-37 infra. 
3. The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that a full range of self-
help remedies is available to labor disputants after the procedures of the RLA have 
been exhausted. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 
387 U.S. 238, 244 (1966); Brotherhood of Locomotive Engrs. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 
372 U.S. 284, 291 (1963); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945). 
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of pay, rules, and working conditions; and the union, in turn, called 
a strike and picketed peacefully at locations where FEC operated, 
including the premises of the Jacksonville Terminal Company, 
which served a number of other railroads.4 The avowed objective of 
the union's picketing was to cause the other carriers using the 
terminal to cease interchanging with the FEC. It was an attempt to 
"elicit a secondary boycott of the FEC ... , [a boycott] which de-
pended for its success upon the aid of the ... [other companies'] 
employees in refusing to cross ... [the union's] picket lines."5 A 
federal district court enjoined all picketing on the terminal premises 
except that which was restricted to a "reserved gate" set aside for 
FEC employees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed, holding that the Norris-LaGuardia Act6 barred 
issuance of a federal injunction,7 and its decision was affirmed by an 
equally divided Supreme Court.8 
While this litigation was pending, the terminal company ob-
tained from a Florida state court an injunction that was virtually 
identical to the earlier federal order.9 That decision was affirmed by 
4. The Jacksonville terminal facility is a corporation owned and controlled jointly 
by four railroads, including the FEC. 
5. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 651 
(5th Cir. 1966). The picket signs read: 
Fellow Railroad Men 
Do Not Cross or Assist F.E.C. 
B. of R.T. 
On Lawful 
Strike 
Against F.E.C. 
Please Make Common Cause With Us In 
Major Dispute Against F.E.C. 
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964). Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964), 
provides: 
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining 
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out 
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested 
in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or 
in concert, any of the following acts: 
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of 
employment; 
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor 
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not 
involving fraud or violence; 
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence 
the acts heretofore specified • • • • 
7. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649, 655 
(5th Cir. 1966). 
8. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 385 U.S. 20 (1966) 
(mem.). 
9. The Florida trial court held that the union activity constituted a secondary 
boycott which was illegal under state law [FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.09(12) (1966)], that 
it violated the state's restraint-of-trade laws [FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 542.01-.12 (1962)], and 
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a Florida district court of appeal.10 The United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari11 to "determine the extent of state power 
to regulate the economic combat of parties subject to the Railway 
Labor Act."12 This case was the first one in which the Supreme Court 
faced a situation involving secondary activity13 by a labor union sub-
ject to the RLA.14 The RLA itself is completely silent on the subject 
of secondary activity; it neither prohibits it nor protects it.15 
that it sought to force the terminal company to violate its duties as a carrier under 
the Florida Transportation Act [FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 351.12, .14-.17, .19 (1968)]. 
10. 201 S.2d 253, appeal dismissed, 207 S.2d 458 (1967), cert. denied, 209 S.2d 670 
(1968). 
11. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 392 U.S. 904 
(1968). 
12. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 372 
(1969). 
13. Secondary activity includes various methods by which a union disputing with 
one employer may bring pressure to bear on other persons-including other employers, 
employees of other employers, and customers-in order to induce them to cease doing 
business with the employer who is party to the dispute. The gravamen of such activity 
is that it involves new parties in the dispute. Under the National Labor Relations 
Act, secondary boycotts are prohibited by § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 15S(b)(4) (1964). See 
note 15 infra. 
14. The industries subject to the RLA are the transportation industries other than 
trucking. The Act traditionally covered only railways, but its coverage has been e.x-
tended to include the airline industry. RLA §§ 1 First, 201-08, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 First, 
181-88 (1964). Labor relations in the railroad industry have generally been thought to 
present unique problems. As Justice Frankfurter once stated: "From the point of 
view of industrial relations our railroads are largely a thing apart." Elgin, Joliet &: 
E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 751 (1945) (dissenting opinion). Indeed, the more general 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964), expressly exempts 
from the Act's coverage employees and employers subject to the Railway Labor Act. 
National Labor Relations Act §§ 2(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3) (1964). 
The RLA procedures cover two basic kinds of labor disputes. First, § 2(4), 45 
U.S.C. § 15la(4) (1964), provides for "the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes 
concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions"; disputes over these issues have 
been labeled "major disputes." Second, § 2(5), 45 U.S.C. § 151a(5) (1964), provides 
for "the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or 
out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or 
working conditions." These latter disputes have been labeled "minor." Major disputes, 
as defined by the Supreme Court, 
present the large issues about which strikes ordinarily arise with the consequent 
interruptions of traffic the Act sought to avoid .... 
The so-called minor disputes, on the other hand, involving grievances, affect 
the smaller differences which inevitably appear in the carrying out of major 
agreements and policies or arise incidentally in the course of an employment. 
They represent specific maladjustments of a detailed or individual quality. 
Elgin, Joliet &: E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-24 (1945). 
15. When an act of Congress is silent on a particular problem, that silence may 
breed complicated problems of federalism. The congressional silence may be inter-
preted as expressing an intent to leave room for state regulation or it may be inter-
preted as indicating that Congress intended to leave the particular conduct free from 
all regulation. Cox &: Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. R.Ev. 211, 
225 (1950). One reason for the RLA's silence on secondary activity, however, may be 
that such activity in the transportation industries has been a rare, indeed almost non-
existent, occurrence. In the 1947 debates over the proposed § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964), Senator Taft stated: 
I want to point out that railway labor has never been covered by the Wagner 
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In a 4-3 decision,16 the Supreme Court held that until Congress 
acts, "picketing-whether characterized as primary or secondary-
must be deemed conduct protected against state proscription."17 Ac-
cordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Florida court and 
lifted the state injunction. Justice Harlan, ·writing for the majority, 
stated that, although state court jurisdiction over the cause was not 
preempted, the issues must be governed by federal law, rather than 
state law, because of paramount federal policies.18 By referring to 
Act; it has always been covered by the. Railway Labor Act, which provides a some-
what different procedure. ·we saw no reason to change that situation, because 
there were no abuses which had arisen in connection with the operation of the 
Railway Labor Act. 
93 CONG. R.Ec. 6498 (1947). 
Contrast the silence of the RLA with the direct prohibition of secondary activity 
under § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964), which was specifically de-
signed to deal with this problem. That section makes it an unfair labor practice for 
a labor organization: 
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any 
person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce to engage in, 
a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, 
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any 
person engaged m commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either 
case an object thereof is: 
{B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . Provided, 
That nothing contained in this clause {B) shall be construed to make unlawful, 
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing •••• 
16. Justices Fortas and Marshall did not participate. 
17. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 393 
{1969). Justice Harlan, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that in the context of 
labor relations the word "protected" may have two distinct meanings. It may refer to 
employee conduct which the states may not prohibit, or to conduct against which the 
employer may not retaliate. 394 U.S. at 382 n.17. Throughout the opinion he used the 
term only in the former sense, and this Recent Development conforms to his usage. 
18. 394 U.S. at 382. The basic standard for the doctrine of pre-emption was estab-
lished in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 {1959), in which 
the Court stated: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 or the Act 
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive com-
petence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference 
with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245. The Garmon doctrine was ex-
tended in Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964), in which the Court con-
sidered a peaceful secondary boycott and a suit for damages under § 303 of the Labor-
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964). The particular conduct 
involved was arguably neither prohibited nor protected by § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress, by enacting § 303 of the LMRA, had 
effectively focused upon a general area and type of conduct, that the particular con-
duct involved was within the ambit of federal regulation under the NLRA, and that 
the state was, therefore, pre-empted from regulating the secondary boycott involved 
in this case. Although the Court in Jacksonville Terminal seems to be correct in its 
holding that state jurisdiction was not pre-empted, since the RLA is silent on the 
subject of secondary activity, its further conclusion that the states cannot regulate 
picketing by an RLA union goes beyond Garmon and Morton. In Morton, the state 
court was precluded from regulating the particular activity because Congress had 
focused on a general type of conduct in the NLRA. The RLA, however, does not 
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national labor policy as manifested in the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), Harlan concluded that. at the one extreme, peaceful 
primary picketing was protected from state regulation, and that, at 
the other extreme, conduct involving violence was definitely not 
protected. Thus, he felt, since the picketing in this case was not 
violent, its susceptibility to state regulation would arguably turn 
on whether it was primary or secondary. But when he was faced 
with the problem of making that determination, Harlan noted the 
"fuzziness" of the distinction between primary activity and secon-
dary activity.19 He concluded that to condem all of the petitioners' 
activities which carried any "secondary" implications would be to 
"paint with much too broad a brush."20 He found that the question 
of which picketing activities are federally protected under the RLA 
and therefore immune from state interference, and which activities 
are subject to prohibition by the states, is a question for considera-
tion by Congress rather than by the Supreme Court.21 Thus, in the 
view of the majority, until Congress establishes standards, the least 
unsatisfactory judicial solution is to hold all picketing protected 
against state proscription.22 
The Jacksonville Terminal decision is anomalous in several re-
spects and seems to have created a "no man's land" with respect to 
governmental control of picketing carried on by unions subject to 
the RLA,23 primarily railroad and airline unions.24 Although 
secondary picketing is prohibited in other industries by section 8(b) 
purport to focus on any type of union activity. Thus, the Court, by not allowing the 
state to regulate the picketing in Jacksonville Terminal, pre-empted the state from 
regulating an area in which Congress has not acted at all. That result should be 
recoguized as a siguificant extension of the pre-emption doctrine, even as developed in 
Morton. 
19. Primary activity is always protected and secondary activity is prohibited under 
the NLRA. In dealing with a situation covered by the NLRA, the Court stated: "Im• 
portant as is the distinction between legitimate 'primary activity' and banned 
'secondary activity,' it does not present a glaringly bright line. The objectives of any 
picketing include a desire to influence others from withholding from the employer 
their services or trade.". Local 761, International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 
U.S. 667, 673 (1961). 
20. 394 U.S. at 390. 
21. 394 U.S. at 391. 
22. 394 U.S. at 392-93. Justice Douglas, in dissent, expressed the view that the right 
to self-help under the RLA should not override state law when a secondary boycott 
threatens to paralyze a whole community. He argued that the states should have a 
free hand in labor controversies unless Congress adopts a contrary policy, and he 
found no such policy concerning secondary activity in the silence of the RLA. 394 
U.S. at 397. 
23. Brief for Respondent at 25, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville 
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). The power of a federal court to enjoin the union's 
picketing had been previously denied. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R.R., 362 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.), affd., 385 U.S. 20 (1966) (4-4 decision). 
24. For a discussion of the coverage of the RLA, see note 14 supra. 
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(4) of the NLRA,25 the Court has given RLA unions the freedom to 
engage in such conduct by saying that, until Congress acts, no one 
may regulate it.26 The Court's method in reaching this result, in con-
junction with its proclaimed deference to Congress, suggests that the 
Jacksonville Terminal decision is intended to prod Congress into 
action on the problem of secondary activity by unions subject to the 
RLA. Consequently, it is essential to inquire into the likelihood of 
congressional action that would remedy both the avowedly "unsatis-
factory" nature of the Court's decision27 and the void that presently 
exists in the RLA. If congressional action in this area does not occur 
in the near future, it may be that the Court's decision will turn out 
to be even more unsatisfactory than imagined. In such circumstances, 
the Court, faced with a similar situation in the future, should pursue 
another alternative.28 
If permanent congressional legislation is passed as a response to 
the Jacksonville Terminal decision, it could take one of two forms: 
(1) the legislation might amend the RLA to deal directly and 
specifically with the problem of secondary boycotts and picketing, 
or (2) the legislation might amend the RLA's emergency procedures 
to fill the void left by the Jacksonville Terminal case. The prob-
ability of both of these forms of legislation must now be discussed. 
If Congress were to adopt the first method and deal specifically 
with secondary conduct, it seems likely that it would prohibit such 
conduct just as has been done under the NLRA.29 Federal labor 
policy is well set against secondary activity by labor unions, 80 and 
there is no apparent reason why this policy should not apply to in-
dustries covered by the RLA as well as to those under the NLRA. 
There· is good reason to believe, however, that even though 
secondary activity does run counter to the labor policy of this coun-
try, congressional legislation making such activity illegal under the 
RLA is highly unlikely. For one thing, secondary conduct applied by 
rail unions or other unions subject to the RLA has been a rare 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964), quoted in note 15 supra. 
26. The respondents felt that the result of the Jacksonville Terminal decision was 
"to put in the hands of railway labor powers to use weapons against third parties 
which are without counterpart in all of American industry." Respondent's Petition 
for Rehearing at 10, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 
394 U.S. 369, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969). 
27. 394 U.S. at 392. 
28. See text accompanying notes 60-69 supra. 
29. § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b){4) (1964), quoted in note 15 supra. 
30. Congressional debates over the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 and the Landrum-
Griffin Act in 1959 evinced a noticeable congressional hostility to secondary activity: 
"In this bill we prohibit secondary boycotts all over this country.'' 93 CoNG. REC. 7537 
(1947) (remarks of Senator Taft); "[I]t was the clear and unequivocal intention of 
Congress in 1947 to outlaw the evils of secondary boycotts • • • .'', 105 CONG. R.Ec. 
15,531 (1959) (remarks of Representative Griffin). 
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occurrence,31 whereas permanent legislation normally deals with 
abuses of a general or recurring nature. Thus, the problem is suf-
ficiently infrequent that it does not commend itself to a legislative 
solution.32 Moreover, the silence of Congress with respect to 
secondary conduct in the railroad and airline industries suggests that 
it has confidence that, when such conduct occurs, the RLA proce-
dures can deal effectively with it.38 Consequently, unless the fre-
quency and seriousness of secondary activity in these industries in-
crease substantially, the necessary motivation for an amendment to 
deal directly with such activity will be lacking. 
The other possible congressional response to the Jacksonville 
Terminal case would be the amendment of the emergency procedures 
of the RLA. The method presently established by the RLA for re-
solving serious disputes culminates in the creation of a presidential 
emergency board.34 The report of that board, however, is not binding 
on the parties.35 Furthermore, there is no indication that Congress 
has any intention of incorporating compulsory arbitration into the 
procedural scheme of the RLA36 since that course of action would 
frustrate the policy of encouraging the voluntary settlement of 
disputes.37 Thus, there is no machinery, either established or con-
templated, for dealing effectively with situations arising under the 
RLA, such as that presented by the union picketing at the Jackson-
ville terminal. Despite this lack of effective machinery to deal with 
serious labor problems in the railway and airline industries, recent 
legislative attempts to amend the emergency procedures of the RLA 
31. 93 CONG. REc. 6498 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft), quoted in note 15 supra. 
32. Id. Moreover, congressional action in response to a particular conflict is im-
peded by obvious political problems. For example, any attempt to deal specifically 
with the Jacksonville Terminal situation "would be inextricably intertwined, as a 
legislative matter, with supporting the strikebreaking efforts of the FEC." Respon-
dent's Petition for Rehearing at 19, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville 
Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969). 
33. Note, Judicial Approaches to Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor 
Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 928, 946 (1967). 
34. RLA § IO, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). 
35. RLA § IO, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964). One commentator has noted that presidential 
boards under the RLA have lost all of their effectiveness as a settler of major disputes. 
Theoretically, the prestige of such a board is supposed to induce the parties to accept 
the board's proposals voluntarily. However, since a board is automatically appointed 
in almost every dispute under the RLA, it has lost its character as an emergency 
measure, and its prestige has diminished accordingly. Curtin, National Emergency 
Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in the Transportation Indmtries, 55 GEO. L.J. 
786 (1967). 
36. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 459, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1963). See also, Curtin, Na-
tional Emergency Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in the Transportation In-
dmtries, 55 GEO. L.J. 786, 803 (1967). 
37. See RLA §§ 2-10, 45 U.S.C. §§ 15la-60 (1964). Indeed, even the ad hoc use of 
compulsory arbitration (see note 39 infra) has been criticized as violative of the 
spirit of the RLA. Comment, The Railway Work Rules Dispute-A Precedent for 
Compulsory Arbitration, 14 DE PAUL L. REv. 115 (1964). 
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have met with little success.38 Congress continues to approach 
emergency labor problems in the transporation industries on an ad 
hoc basis.39 
It appears that it would take a true "national" emergency, created 
by secondary activity of a union subject to the RLA, to induce 
Congress to make a permanent amendment of the emergency proce-
dures of the Act.40 The situation created by the picketing at the 
Jacksonville terminal, while harmful to Florida's economy,41 is not 
the kind of nationwide emergency that would compel congressional 
action. Thus, the regulatory void created by the Jacksonville Term-
inal decision is unlikely to be sufficient by itself to overcome con-
gressional inertia. In all probability, then, the Supreme Court's 
prodding of Congress in the Jacksonville Terminal decision will be 
fruitless. 
Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion in Jacksonville Terminal 
that federal law should govern appears sound. As the Court stated, 
"the potentials for conflict ... and for the imposition of inconsistent 
state obligations ... are simply too great to allow each state which 
happens to gain personal jurisdiction over a party to a railroad labor 
dispute to decide for itself what economic self-help that party may 
or may not pursue."42 Moreover, the subject matter of the RLA-
labor relations in the transportation industries-is peculiarly sus-
ceptible to uniform national regulation.43 If federal law is to govern 
38. For example, in 1967, Representative Pickle of Texas proposed to amend § 10 
of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1964), to provide for a "Special Board'' whose determina-
tion would be binding on the parties for up to two years. H.R. 5638, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1967). The proposal was referred to the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, but no further action on the bill has been reported. 
39. Two of the most recent examples of such emergency congressional legislation 
were concerned with the work rules dispute in the railroad industry in 1963 and the 
threatened airline strike in 1967. In the work rules dispute, Congress, in effect, 
ordered compulsory arbitration on the two basic issues of disagreement. Act of Aug. 
28, 1963, 77 Stat. 132. That law was upheld in Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. 
Chicago, Burlington &: Quincy R.R., 225 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C.), afjd., 331 F.2d 
1020 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 918 (1964). To deal with the impending 
airlines strike, Congress passed emergency legislation that temporarily extended the 
time within which, under § 10 of the RLA, no change of conditions could be made. 
Act of April 12, 1967, 81 Stat. 12. The parties eventually resolved their dispute within 
that extended time period. 
40. As one commentator has observed: "While the public's representatives appear 
to recognize the need for legislative reform, the appropriate combination of circum-
stances to support enactment of effective laws may not be present until another major 
strike occurs.'' Curtin, National Emergency Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in 
the Transportation Industries, 55 GEO. L.J. 786, 809 (1967). 
41. The Florida trial court found that a continuation of the picketing would 
cause the "economic strangulation" of Florida. Brief for Respondent at 13, Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). 
42. 394 U.S. at 381. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 
236, 250 (1959) Uustice Harlan, concurring); Note, Judicial Approaches to Secondary 
Boycotts Under the Railway Labor Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 928, 944 (1967). 
43. See, e.g., International Assn. of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 
682, 691-92 (1963). 
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cases such as Jacksonville Terminal, however, it is arguable that in 
future cases, the Court should be more responsive to the need for a 
definition of that law.44 
The Jacksonville Terminal decision can be interpreted in such 
a way as to permit the Court to develop appropriate federal law on 
secondary activity by RLA unions if the issue is presented to the 
Court a second time. Several factors support this view. First, as dis-
cussed above, the unsatisfactory nature of the Court's solution in 
Jacks(!nville Terminal was admitted by Justice Harlan himself.45 
Second, the Court in Jacksonville Terminal did not actually negate 
its power to act in such circumstances. Rather, its decision rested 
more on a theory of discretionary judicial abstention, due in this case 
to an alleged lack of guidelines available to the Court.46 Finally, there 
is precedent for the Court's determination that it should assume the 
responsibility for developing a uniform federal standard concerning 
secondary activity by unions subject to the RLA. In Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills,41 the Court held that the substantive law to 
be applied in suits under section 30l(a) of the NLRA48 was federal 
law and was to be developed on a case-by-case basis. According to 
that decision, the Court was to fashion a body of federal common 
law to govern the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.49 
Its sources were to be "the policies of the federal labor statutes, 
state contract law where appropriate, arbitrators' decisions, and so 
on."50 
44. Since the RLA itself is silent on the question of secondary activity, the present 
gap in federal regulation of such activity must be filled either by new legislation or 
by judicial interpretation. It is unlikely that Congress will provide the former (see 
notes 29-41 supra and accompanying text), and the Court in Jacksonville Terminal 
refused to supply the latter. 
45. 394 U.S. at 392. This factor is underscored by the slim majority in Jacksonville 
Terminal, a 4-3 decision, with Justices Fortas and Marshall not participating. 
46. 394 U.S. at 391-92. Justice Harlan expressed the view that the Court lacked 
the "expertise and competence" (394 U.S. at 392) to designate which of the union's 
picketing activities are "federally protected, and therefore immune from state inter-
ference, and which of them ••. [are] ••. subject to prohibition by the State." 394 
U.S. at 391. However, the question is not so much one of the expertise and competence 
of the Court as it is one of the Court's power and duty. See notes 51-59 infra and 
accompanying text. 
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964), which provides: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization 
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to 
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 
49. See, e.g., UAW v. Hoosiers Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); John Wiley 8: 
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 
U.S. 502 (1962). 
50. St. Antoine, Judicial Valour and the Warren Court's Labor Decisions, 67 MICH. 
L. REv. 317, 322 (1968). 
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On the other hand, the movement of the Court into areas in 
which the legislature has not acted has been criticised, 51 and the 
critics' arguments deserve attention. Their central concern is with 
the proper role of the Court in the area of labor relations. By formu-
lating a federal law governing secondary activity by unions covered 
by the RLA, they feel, the Court would be passing judgment on im-
portant policy matters of labor relations. The Court's assumption of 
that task would arguably go beyond its action in Lincoln Mills. In 
that case the Court was assuming a traditional judicial function-
reserving the right to review the formulation of basic contract law. 
In the situation at hand, however, the Court would be fashioning 
standards which go to the heart of what unions can and cannot do, 
that is, it would be making labor relations policy. Such a task, the 
critics contend, is peculiarly appropriate for the legislative branch 
of the govemment.52 Indeed, if the critics of judicial activism would 
allow the Court to fill a legislative void at all, they would require 
that a clear legislative intent be ascertainable so that the judicial 
decision could be guided by definitive standards.53 
Nevertheless, since Congress is unlikely to express itself with 
respect to secondary activity by unions covered by the RLA, 54 and 
since the area is particularly suited to regulation by a uniform rule 
of federal law, the mere existence of congressional power to fill the 
legistative gap should not require judicial abstention.55 The crucial 
inquiry is whether the need for a federal rule is immediate and 
serious enough to offset the Court's reluctance to enter what is 
51. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 464-65 (1957) 
Gustice Frankfurter, dissenting); H. WELUNGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 
(1968). 
52. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) Gustice 
Frankfurter). On the other hand, counsel for the terminal company argued that the 
task which the Court refused to assume was basically one of filling a small interstitial 
gap in the federal labor law, and that such a task was of "considerably less magnitude 
than that which the Coun undertook for the Federal judiciary in the Lincoln Mills 
case-that of articulating a corpus of Federal labor contract law-not to mention 
the bodies of adjudication which resulted from this Court's decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education, 394 U.S. 294 (1955), and .•• Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964)." Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 18, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen 
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969). 
53. Bickel &: Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln 
Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 (1957). Indeed the Court in Jacksonville Terminal 
used similar language. 394 U.S. at 391. 
54. See notes 32-41 supra and accompanying text. 
55. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), in which the 
Court held that the United States rights and duties with respect to the commercial 
paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law. In that case, the 
Court stated: "In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts 
to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards." 318 U.S. at 367. 
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ordinarily the province of the legislature.56 Although the Court 
recognized a vital need for a uniform rule,57 it does not appear to 
have directly considered the further question of the importance of 
developing that rule immediately, as a court, but not a legislature, 
could do. The fact that the Jacksonville Terminal decision was based 
on the Court's lack of expertise and competence confirms the sug-
gestion that the Court did not reach the question of timely judicial 
action.58 It appears, however, in light of the Florida court's finding 
that the activity of the union in these circumstances could cause 
serious economic damage to the entire state,59 that the need in this 
area is sufficiently serious to warrant judicial action. 
If the Court in a future case should decide to formulate a federal 
rule of protected and prohibited secondary activity under the RLA, 
it must then examine the available sources and guidelines that it 
might use in creating the appropriate federal law.00 The RLA itself 
provides no assistance since it is completely silent on the subject of 
secondary activity. The Jacksonville Terminal Court specifically re-
jected the possibility of using common-law principles concerning 
secondary activity as a basis for formulating standards of protected 
and prohibited conduct under the RLA.61 Indeed, since common-law 
definitions as to what constitutes illegal secondary activity vary 
widely from court to court, the majority in Jacksonville Terminal 
was probably correct in its decision to refrain from using the com-
mon law as a source of available standards.62 The most obvious 
56. See, e.g., Friedman, Limits of Judicial Lawmaking and Prospective Overruling, 
29 MODERN L. R.Ev. 593 (1966). 
57. 394 U.S. at 381. 
58. 394 U.S. at 390-91. 
59. 394 U.S. at 374; see note 41 supra. 
60. The absence of such sources was apparently a major obstacle for the Court in 
Jacksonville Terminal. See 394 U.S. at 391-92. See also Note, Judicial Approaches to 
Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 928 (1967). 
61. 394 U.S. at 386-87, 391. 
62. The Court stated: "And the common law of labor relations has created no 
.concept more elusive than that of 'secondary' conduct; it has drawn no lines more 
arbitrary, tenuous, and shifting than those separating 'primary' from 'secondary' ac-
tivities .... For these reasons •.• this body of common law offers no guidance for 
the problem at hand." 394 U.S. at 386-87. At common law, the secondary boycott 
was a tort, characterized either as an intentional infliction of economic harm or as a 
wrongful interference with contractual relations. See Vv. PROSSER, TORTS § 124, at 992 
(3d ed. 1965). The general rule was that secondary activity could not lawfully be 
employed in a labor dispute. See E. OAKES, ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDU51'RIAL CON-
FLICTS § 428, at 658 (1927). But the agreement ended there, and virtually every court 
employed a different standard in deciding whether certain conduct was secondary 
and therefore illegal. As one study has noted: 
An elementary familiarity with the dogma of labor law discloses the touchstone 
of the law of the "secondary boycott"-its illegality. The term has been the func-
tion of a desired result rather than a functional characteristic of any given fact 
situation or situations. Identical fact situations have been found to be and not to 
be a "secondary boycott" and their legality has varied with this nominalism .••• 
It is in the treatment of those cases involving labor's most utilized weapon-
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source available to the Court is section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA63 and 
the various interpretations that have been given to that section by 
the National Labor Relations Board and by the Court itself. The 
Court in Jacksonville Terminal, however, concluded that there was 
no justification for incorporating into the RLA the "panoply of 
detailed law developed by the National Labor Relations Board and 
courts under § 8(b)(4)."64 That view was reinforced by the specific 
exemption of those labor organizations subject to the RLA.65 Yet 
total incorporation of section 8(b)(4) is not the only means of uti-
lizing that source. Thus, reluctance to adopt the entire doctrine 
should not prevent the Court from employing, as a foundation for 
its fashioning of federal law, the basic policies and guidelines which 
both the NLRB and the courts have used in construing section S(b) 
(4). 
It can be argued that such an approach would eventually lead 
to the very result which Justice Harlan warned against in Jackson-
ville Terminal-that the Court could not begin to draw analogies 
to the NLRA without incorporating the "full panoply" of law that 
has been developed under section 8(b)(4). But even if that result 
should occur, it might not be totally objectionable so long as the 
Court can retain some flexibility in its approach to disputes in the 
industries covered by the RLA. 
In this connection, it should be recognized that there may be 
some factual disputes in these industries which cannot be resolved 
solely by the application of section 8(b)(4) concepts. In such cases, 
the Court must draw upon other relevant federal policies and stat-
utes in deciding whether particular union activity should be pro-
tected or prohibited. For example, the union's picketing at the Jack-
sonville terminal, if analyzed solely in terms of section 8(b)(4), might 
very well be found to be protected conduct under the "common 
situs" and "roving situs" doctrines. 66 Indeed, under the "roving 
the picket-that the analytical treatment of the "secondary boycott" has sunk to 
its lowest ebb. 
Bernard & Graham, Labor and the Secondary Boycott, 15 WASH. L. REv. 137, 138-39, 
149 (19·10). Compare, e.g., Quinton's Market, Inc. v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 21 N.E.2d 
546 (1939), with In re Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 81 P.2d 190 (1938). 
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964); see note 15 supra. 
64. 394 U.S. at 391. 
65. § 2(3), 29 U .s.c. § 152(3) (1964). 
66. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 
389-90 (1969). The basis for these doctrines was first announced in Sailors' Union & 
Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). Under the "common situs" doctrine, 
when a primary employer does business on the premises of a secondary employer, or 
when the primary and secondary do business on the same premises, the picketing of 
the primary is lawful primary activity as long as four conditions are present: (1) the 
picketing is strictly limited to times when primary employees are present on the 
premises of the secondary employer or on common premises; (2) the primary employer 
is engaged in his normal business at the picketed premises at the time of the picket-
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situs" doctrine, a striking RLA union might be able to carry on 
protected picketing at every terminal at which the primary employer 
stops.67 But if the Court is not limited in its analysis to analogies 
drawn from section 8(b)(4), it could consider the policies evinced 
by the Interstate Commerce Act68 and the duties placed on common 
carriers by that Act to furnish transportation and to afford reason-
able and proper facilities for the interchange of traffic. 00 In doing 
so, the Court might find that the public's right to free access to 
transportation facilities outweighs the interest of RLA unions in 
picketing every terminal serviced by a particular carrier. The crucial 
point is that in cases in which section 8(b)(4) would not provide a 
complete framework of guidelines because of the peculiarities of the 
transportation industries, the Court should examine other statutes 
and national policies before deciding whether the alleged secondary 
activity is to be protected or prohibited. 
In the final analysis, however, the Jacksonville Terminal Court 
may well have been correct in concluding that "there is no really 
satisfactory judicial solution"70 to the problem of secondary activity 
engaged in by unions subject to the RLA. In fact, a decision that the 
Court should develop the federal law to govern the area would place 
an enormous burden on the judicial system. Nevertheless, although 
the Jacksonville Terminal Court purported to abstain from formu-
lating a rule and ostensibly deferred to Congress, it unavoidably did 
formulate law in the area.71 As it now stands, should congressional 
ing; (3) the picketing clearly discloses that the dispute is with the primary employer 
alone; (4) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of the 
situs. Under the "roving situs" doctrine, when the business operations of the primary 
employer are ambulatory and come to rest on the premises of a secondary employer, 
a union is permitted to picket the premises of the secondary as long as the "common 
situs" test is met. For discussions of the "common situs" doctrine by the Supreme 
Court, see United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 367 U.S. 492 (1964); Local 761, 
International Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 
67. See Note, Judicial Approaches to Secondary Boycotts Under the Railway Labor 
Act, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 928, 945 n.125 (1967). 
68. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1-27 (1964). 
69. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1(4), 3(4) (1964). 
70. 394 U.S. at 392. One commentator has· noted: 
In the context of labor relations, the judicial process is a doubtful instrument for 
filling the policy and power vacuum left by Congress. • .. [T]he Court, no matter 
how it decides, cannot escape the charge that it is preferring one powerful in-
terest over another, or one of two competing faiths about the contemporary role 
of State as opposed to federal power. 
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations 
(pt. II), 59 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 301 (1959). 
71. Counsel for the terminal company has argued this proposition: 
The Court's decision accordingly belies the principle of neutrality on which it 
purports to be based . 
. • • The result is precisely the same as if Congress had passed a statute affirma-
tively declaring the practice of secondary boycotts on the nation's railroad system 
to be one of the keystones of the country's public policy. 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 8-9, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jack-
sonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, rehearing denied, 394 U.S. 1024 (1969). 
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action not occur, picketing by RLA unions cannot be regulated by 
the states and cannot be enjoined by either state or federal courts.72 
Of course, if secondary activity in the transportation industries 
continues to be an uncommon occurrence, or if Congress does amend 
the RLA in response to Jacksonville Terminal, the Court's decision 
not to formulate standards of protected and prohibited activity will 
be vindicated. Indeed, it is possible that the holding in Jacksonville 
Terminal could itself encourage increased secondary activity by 
unions subject to the RLA and thus create a national transporation 
emergency which could trigger congressional amendment of the Act. 
But in the absence of such an emergency, Congress is unlikely to 
amend the RLA in the near future.73 For this reason, the Court 
should assume a more active role in creating a uniform federal law 
when it is again faced with the choice of protecting or prohibiting 
secondary activity by RLA unions. 
72. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Linc R.R., 362 F.2d 649 
(5th Cir.), affd., 385 U.S. 20 (1966) (4-4 decision). 
73. Curtin, National Emergency Legislation: Its Need and Its Prospects in the 
Transportation Industries, 55 GEO, L.J. 786, 809 (1967). See also notes 29-41 supra and 
accompanying text. 
